Since commencing his second term as United States president, Donald Trump has distanced the US from Ukraine and warmed relations with Russia.
This presents a predicament for European nations.
A changing landscape
Europe relies on the US for military and technology capability.
The US is responsible for more than a third of the total funds spent on defence worldwide.
It is also a critical member of the NATO security alliance and has more than 80,000 troops on the European continent.
Since January 20, the Trump administration has coupled economic isolationism with a surprisingly interventionist foreign policy agenda.
This is driven by a realist, interests-based approach to political leadership.
Trump’s actions align with a worldview that emphasises material advantage over values and ideas – the interests of great and regional powers are considered to be the only ones that matter.
The heated exchange between Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 28 underscored the crumbling architecture and protocols of the international rules-based order in place since the second world war.
It appears the Trump administration may expect unilateral concessions from Ukraine to Russia for peace. This would likely include ceding significant territory to Russia.
Read more: In siding with Russia over Ukraine, Trump is not putting America first. He is hastening its decline
A rock and a hard place
Ukraine borders four EU and NATO-member countries: Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. This poses a serious security risk.
Europe’s foremost security challenge is to deter Russia from further offensive action on the continent.
European countries have a direct interest in stopping the war, because a continuing conflict presents a costly threat, draining resources in military and humanitarian aid.
According to the Kiel institute for the World Economy, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European countries have collectively committed more than $US138 billion ($A222 billion) in military and non-military aid.
European countries want to see an end to the war that leaves Ukraine a safe and sovereign nation state. For European countries, it is crucial that any political settlement effectively deters Russia from further incursions into Ukrainian or Eastern European territory.
Without deterrence measures in place, there is no guaranteed prevention of wider state-to-state conflict on the European continent in future.
On the one hand, Europe needs the US military and economic might. On the other hand, Europe has pressing security concerns that drive a divergence from the US in its position on Ukraine.
How far will Trump go with Russia?
A key question on European leaders’ minds is: will the NATO alliance hold if there is an incursion into NATO-member territory?
If the borders of Poland or a Baltic state are violated, NATO’s article 5 will be triggered. This article requires the collective defense by all NATO allies of any ally under attack.
This could mean the US is obliged to join a direct confrontation with Russia.
Would Trump actually commit US military support to a fight with Russia? Or would the US abandon their NATO treaty obligations?
Trump’s rhetoric and actions so far suggest European countries should prepare for the latter possibility.
Read more: How Trump's spat with Zelensky threatens the security of the world – including the US
Strategic autonomy and deterrence
Given this dilemma, Europe needs to focus on strategic autonomy and deterrence.
Strategic autonomy includes not only defence, but also economics, environment, energy and values.
In terms of defence, strategic autonomy means Europe taking more responsibility for its own security. Former European Defence Agency chief Jorge Domecq notes this includes having the ability to “develop, operate, modify and maintain the full spectrum of defence capabilities”.
Effective deterrence of further Russian aggression on the continent requires providing substantive security guarantees to Ukraine. This may include a multilateral security structure for European countries (without the US) that could guarantee Ukraine’s security.
The idea of a European Army has also reemerged. This would go beyond defence cooperation to full military and strategic integration. Such an entity could underpin a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine.
At a summit in London on March 2, EU countries and the UK proposed a one-month truce that could be followed by European troops on the ground in Ukraine to maintain the peace.
What does Ukraine want from Europe?
A Gallup survey in late 2024 suggests the percentage of Ukrainians who want a negotiated end to the war has increased from about 20% in early 2022 to more than 50% in late 2024.
Over the same period, those who favour fighting for a military solution has declined from more than 70% to just under 40%.
The same survey revealed most Ukrainians prefer a key role for the EU in negotiations (70%) and the UK (63%), with less than half preferring a significant role from Trump.
Interestingly, more than 40% supported a central role for Turkey in negotiations.
China: a country to watch
China’s approach to Russia and the war could have an impact on Europe’s security and political stability.
China is mostly concerned with domestic economic growth and regime stability, and it has not directly involved itself in the war in Ukraine.
However, China is a close friend of Russia and a security ally of North Korea, which is currently fighting in the Kursk province of Russia against Ukrainian forces.
In 2023, China put forward its own “peace plan” proposal for Ukraine.
A rapprochement between the US and Russia may be viewed unfavourably by China which could see this as a threat to its own regional geopolitical influence.
China maintains significant influence over Russian President Vladimir Putin due to economic and security ties.
If China senses a fundamental shift in the international order, it may become more assertive in attempting to influence Russia and the trajectory of the war in Ukraine.
For Europe, distancing from the US may mean getting closer to China.
However, this comes with its own risks.
Jessica Genauer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
