Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
A news report that Russia has sought to base long-range aircraft in Indonesia caught Australia’s political leaders by surprise during an already hectic election campaign.
The military publication Janes reported on Tuesday that Russia had requested permission for its aircraft to be based at the Manuhua Air Force Base in Indonesia’s easternmost province of Papua.
The base is just 1,300 kilometres away from Darwin.
Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles issued a statement denying the report, saying his Indonesian counterpart assured him there would be no Russian planes based in Indonesia. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said he was seeking “further clarification” with Jakarta about the Janes report.
Janes is a respected outlet when it comes to defence news, so it’s likely the Russians did float the idea, even if it might have been done at lower levels.
Why would Russia be cosying up to Indonesia?
Since Prabowo Subianto came to power as Indonesia’s new president last October, Moscow and Jakarta have sought to deepen their military ties. In fact, the two countries conducted their first-ever joint naval exercises a month after Prabowo took office.
But this isn’t a totally new strategy by Moscow, which has tried on numerous occasions to pivot to Asia to give itself more economic heft and leverage in the region.
The Kremlin is also cognisant that Europe won’t be a friend for the foreseeable future. As such, it’s even more pressing for Russia to establish itself as a player in the Indo-Pacific region – and with that comes a miltary and security presence.
About ten years ago, for instance, the Russian regime secured an agreement with Vietnam to allow its air force to refuel their aircraft at a former US base in the country. Russia also had interest in reestablishing a submarine base in Vietnam and has sold submarines to the country.
In addition, Moscow has sought to sell defence technology and fighter jets to Indonesia for some time, seeing it as a potentially lucrative market for Russian arms. Beyond defence, the bilateral relationship has also focused on energy and education.
These attempts to deepen Moscow-Jakarta ties form part of a targeted Russian campaign to boost its relationships with a number of Southeast Asian nations.
What about the timing?
If the Janes report is accurate, the timing of the purported approach from Russia would be interesting. The report said it came after a meeting between Sergei Shoigu (recently demoted from Russia’s defence minister to an inferior role as secretary of the Russian Security Council) and Indonesia’s defence minister in February of this year.
At the time, the United States was distracted by the first chaotic weeks of US President Donald Trump’s second term in office.
So, if Russia did make such a request, it would be highly opportunistic, especially given Jakarta has been keen to deepen ties with Moscow.
It is also noteworthy that Indonesia recently joined the BRICS, the group of rapidly emerging economies that also includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Russia, among others.
Read more: Indonesia's BRICS agenda: 2 reasons Prabowo's foreign policy contrasts with Jokowi's
How concerned should Australia be?
Even though both Canberra and Jakarta dismissed the report, there was good reason for Australia to be concerned.
Russia’s long-range aviation assets, notably the venerable Tu-95, which is used for reconnaissance as well as strategic bombing, can easily travel over 10,000 kilometres.
From a base in Indonesia, this would give the Russian air force the ability to conduct ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaisance) missions during Australian military exercises, gather data on military installations in the Northern Territory (which also host US Marines), and even conduct surveillance on US military activities in Guam.
Equally, given the closeness of ties between Beijing and Moscow, any Russian intelligence that was gathered could be shared with China.
The reported Russian military interest in Indonesia will also have irritated Australian foreign policy makers, especially since Canberra has invested significant diplomatic capital in boosting Australia-Indonesia ties.
Fortunately, the closeness of the relationship, which includes recently upgraded defence ties, will also have allowed for some plain speaking from Australian interlocutors.
They will doubtless have pointed out that agreeing to any such Kremlin request would cast significant doubt on Indonesian claims about non-alignment. It would also be viewed unfavourably by other regional actors, who have no interest in seeing an enhanced Russian military presence in the region.
The assurance from Jakarta that no Russian planes would be based in Indonesia is therefore a positive development.
But ultimately the reported Russian request is another example of the messy and fragmented world we now live in.
It highlights the reality that Australia will sometimes have to do business with partners who have friends we don’t like. Under those conditions, being firm on issues that threaten our national interests – like the prospective basing of military assets by a hostile power close to our shores – becomes all the more important.
Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Atlantic Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.
