Sudan’s south-western city of Nyala in Darfur recently became the centre of a significant political development.
After more than two years of fighting Sudan’s army, an alliance of armed and political groups backed by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces announced the formation of a parallel government on 20 July 2025.
The new administration, dubbed the Government of Peace and Unity, is a coalition of armed movements from Darfur in Sudan’s western region, and Kordofan in the central region. Together, these regions account for about 46% of Sudan’s total land area.
The coalition has made Nyala its base. The city is a transit hub, with an airport and railway terminus. It is also a trading centre for gum arabic, one of Sudan’s largest exports and a key ingredient in making food, drinks and medicines.
The coalition’s stated aim is to establish a more representative governing structure for Sudan’s peripheral regions. It has 24 member groups.
In my view, however, the creation of a parallel government reflects the reality that neither the Rapid Support Forces nor its rival Sudanese army is close to victory. This view is informed by my research on Sudan’s political developments and its conflict dynamics for close to a decade.
The creation of a parallel government appears to be about entrenching the paramilitary group’s control in its western strongholds as the conflict continues. It risks cementing a permanent division of the country.
Why form a parallel government?
The Rapid Support Forces emerged from the Janjaweed militias that fought in Darfur, western Sudan, in the 2000s. Once allied with the state, the group grew into a powerful governmental paramilitary force, competing with the Sudanese Armed Forces for control of Sudan’s politics and economy.
When full-scale war broke out in April 2023, the Rapid Support Forces quickly seized much of western Sudan, particularly the Darfur region. It is country’s largest region, home to around 10 million people and spanning 500,000 square kilometres.
Darfur shares borders with Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. It is also the Rapid Support Forces’ leadership’s home territory. It contains vast reserves of gold, fertile farmland and major production zones for gum arabic.
With little chance of outright military victory and its image in tatters, the paramilitary group has sought to reinvent itself politically. The group’s reputation has been devastated by reports of ethnic cleansing, sexual violence and atrocities against civilians.
The new Government of Peace and Unity is its attempt to gain favour. By forging alliances with other armed movements and community groups, the group is trying to position itself as the voice of Sudan’s marginalised peripheries.
Coalition partners include the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), the largest non-state armed group in Sudan. The group controls territory in Kordofan and advocates for the establishment of a secular state.
The new coalition’s founding charter calls for:
This resonates with communities such as the Fur who have suffered decades of exclusion by Sudan’s political elite. Most of these leaders come from the country’s northern and central regions.
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The timing of the announcement reflects both political and military calculations.
The Rapid Support Forces and its allies control large areas in western Sudan but have faced challenges expanding further east, where the Sudanese army remains entrenched.
Establishing a formal administration allows the coalition to strengthen its influence in the territories it already holds, and build alliances with local communities. It also helps create political structures that can engage with external actors.
Broadening the political base
Key figures from influential political groups have taken senior positions within the parallel government.
The Rapid Support Forces commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti) has assumed the role of president of the presidential council. Abdelaziz al-Hilu, the leader of SPLM-N, was appointed as vice-president.
Fadlallah Burma, head of a faction of the Umma Party, the former ruling party, took the position of speaker of the legislative council. Mohamed al-Ta’ayshi, a politician from the Arab Ta’aisha tribe, was appointed prime minister.
Leaders from African-origin communities such as the Fur have also taken positions within the administration. Many of these groups have faced Sudanese army airstrikes and have historical grievances against the central state.
However, legitimacy at home is not enough. The Rapid Support Forces also hopes to use foreign alliances to force international recognition.
Kenya hosted the coalition’s launch conference. The group has also cultivated ties with actors in Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and eastern Libya. These relationships have already helped the group consolidate control over key border areas, particularly in Libya, which spans a 382km border.
Serious challenges remain
The Rapid Support Forces-led project faces major obstacles.
Internal rivalries over power sharing have delayed the announcement of a full cabinet. Key ministries, including defence, foreign affairs and finance, remain unassigned.
Militarily, the Rapid Support Forces cannot claim uncontested authority even in its western strongholds. Sudanese army-allied forces still control El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. The army also maintains an overwhelming advantage in the air, making it impossible for the parallel government to project control beyond its core zones.
Internationally, the initiative has been widely condemned by the African Union and the Arab League.
The risks ahead
The failure of international mediation has left Sudan’s conflict at an impasse.
Tensions between Egypt and the United Arab Emirates – both key players in an international mediation effort that also includes the US and Saudi Arabia – have further complicated the search for a political solution.
Their tensions led to the postponement of a peace meeting in Washington in July 2025. The meeting was called off after Egypt, which supports the army, rejected the UAE’s proposal to exclude the two major warring parties from Sudan’s transitional government.
In this context, the Rapid Support Forces’ bid for legitimacy may fuel a more intense struggle with the army rather than a push towards compromise.
Three battlegrounds are likely to escalate.
The battle for El Fasher: Military confrontations are likely to escalate in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, as it remains the only major area in the region not under the control of the Rapid Support Forces.
The air war: The paramilitary group may try to procure advanced weapons to counter the army’s air dominance.
The humanitarian front: The parallel government could use aid routes to gain recognition. The UN has shown flexibility in engaging with de facto authorities in Sudan, prompting the army to block such efforts by controlling border crossings and routes as much as possible.
The longer the stalemate lasts, the greater the risk that Sudan will fragment beyond repair, which is unlikely to benefit any party involved.
What needs to happen next
One immediate step the international community could take is to expand and strictly enforce the arms embargo on Sudan. This could reduce the flow of weapons to both sides and create pressure for a return to negotiations.
In addition, a new political process is urgently needed, one less vulnerable to regional rivalries than the four-nation initiative.
International actors must also find ways to deliver humanitarian aid directly, even if that means air drops into hard-to-reach areas. This will help reduce civilian suffering and prevent both sides from weaponising aid access.
Without such interventions, Sudan’s future could be defined by a protracted war that leaves the state hollowed out and communities further devastated.
Samir Ramzy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
